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ESTATE OF VAl

[L. A. No. 28168.

In Bank.

[65 C.2d

Aug. 25, 1966.]

Estate of GIOVANNI VAl, Deceased. ALAN CRANSTON,
as State Controller, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v.
HENRY G. BODKIN, as Executor, etc., et at, Objectors
and Appellants.
[1] Taxation-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Effective
at or After Death.-A testator's bequest to a daughter pursuant to a valid contract entered into during the testator's lifetime is not subject to inheritance tax where the testator
received full consideration for the promised bequest in money
or money's worth within the meaning of the inheritance tax
law.
[2] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Effective at or
After Death.-Assuming validity of and sufficient certainty in
a property settlement agreement, as well as adequate consideration under the inheritance tax law for a promise in the agreement to make a bequest to the parties' daughter, though the
actual transfer to the daughter was postponed until the promisor's death, her rights arose immediately on the signing of the
agreement; and the will, being merely a conduit for performing
the obligation for which the promisor's estate would be liable
in any event, could not render the bequest subject to inherit~
ance tax.
[3] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Effective at or
After Death.-When a testator provides in his will for payment of a valid obligation supported by adequate consideration
within the meaning of the inheritance tax law and the obligation would be enforceable without regard to the will, payment
of the obligation pursuant to the will is not taxable as a
transfer by will. (Disapproving Estate 01 Grogan, 63 Ca1.App.
536 [219 P. 87], insofar as it is inconsistent with the views
expressed. )
[4] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Effective at or
After Death.-Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 18, §§ 13601-13603 (a) ,
making a transfer by will subject to inheritance tax even
though made pursuant to the decedent's agreement with the
transferee for adequate consideration, do not represent a
correct interpretation of the legislative intent as to the taxability of such transfers.
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Inheritance and Gift Taxes, § 26; Am. Jur.,
Inheritance, Estate, and Gift Taxes (rev ed §§ 159 et seq).
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Taxation, § 432; [5] Taxation,
§ 424(1) (c); [6-8] Taxation, § 431(1); [9] Taxation, § 431(2);
[10] Taxation, § 431(6).
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[6] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Exemptions.-Under Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 13981, proscribing a deduction for anything that does not
actually reduce the amount of nn inheritance or transfer, the
word "transfer" was not intended to relate to a transfer by
will where the beneficiary has the right to receive the transfer
independently of the will.
[6] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Consideration.
-A testator's bequest for the support of his daughter pursuant to a property settlement agreement was free from inheritance tax only if the circumstances indicated the testator
received adequate consideration for his promise ~o make the
bequest.
[7] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Consideration.
-Sufficient consideration as between spouses in a property
settlement agreement does not warrant the conclusion that the
consideration was sufficient for the purposes of determining
whether an inheritance tax is due on a bequest in a will made
pursuant to the terms of the property settlement agreement.
[8] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-ConSfderation.
-The purpose of Rev. & Tax. Code, §§ 13641-13648, making a
testator's actual transfer of property during his lifetime
taxable under inheritance tax law to the extent it was made
without valuable consideration where the testator retained
certain incidents of ownership· over the property during his
life, is to prevent evasion of inheritance tax.
[9] ld.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Consideration.
-To determine whether a testator received consideration for
his promise in a property settlement agreement to make a
bequest, events that occurred after his death and that affected
the terms of the agreement cannot be ignored; and where his
estate was enriched to the extent his wife received less than
she was entitled to receive had she rescinded the agreement for
his fraud, the consideration received by the testator for his
promise to make the bequest and, accordingly, the limit of the
deduction allowable for inheritance tax purposes must be
measured by the difference between what the wife would have
received through recission and the amount she received under
the agreement and the later compromise settlement.
[10] Id.-Inheritance Tax-Transfers Inter Vivos-Consideration.
. -A testator's being entitled to the custody of his daughter
pursuant to a property settlement agreement in which he
promised to make a bequest for the daughter's support could
not be viewed as consideration in money or money's worth for
the purpose of determining adequacy of consideration for the
bequest so as to exempt it from inheritance tax.
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County overruling an objection to the report of an
inheritance tax appraiser and fixing an inheritance tax on a
trust estate. Harold R. Haberkorn, Judge. Reversed.
Michael G. Luddy, Harry A. Olivar, George R. Phillips and
Henry G. Bodkin, Jr., for Objectors and Appellants.
Charles J. Barry, Walter H. Miller and James F. Rogers for
Petitioner and Respondent.
MOSK, J.-This is an appeal by the executors of the will of
Giovanni (John) Vai from an order fixing an inheritance tax .
and overruling objections to a report of the inheritance tax
appraiser imposing a tax on property placed in trust for
John's daughter under the_terms of his will. [1] The question for determination is whether an inheritance tax may be
levied on property which a testator leaves to a daughter by
will pursuant to a valid contract entered into during his lifetime. We hold, for reasons which shall hereinafter appear, that
such a bequest is not subject to an inheritance tax if the
testator has received full consideration in money or money'8
worth, within the meaning of the inheritance tax law, for the
promised bequest.
John and Tranquilla Vai were married in 1907. They had
one daughter, Madeline (now 40 years old) who is mentally
arrested and requires constant care and attention. After a
period of marital discord, Tranquilla filed an action for separate maintenance against John. In March 1953 they entered
into a property settlement agreement through which Tranquilla was to receive less than half the community property
but John undertook to support Madeline during his lifetime,
to hold his wife harmless for Madeline's support, and to
provide in his will that a sufficient amount of property be left
in trust for Madeline to support her as long as she lived. 1
1 Article IV of the property settlement agreement provides in part, I I The
Husband covenants and agrees to assume full responsibility for the support, maintenance and care of said Madeline Vai and represents that he
has heretofore made a Will wherein and whereby a trust is created for the
support, maintenance and care of said Madeline Vai after the death of the
Husband. The Husband hereby covenants and agrees and binds himself to
maintain in full force and effect, a Last Will and Testament which shall
provide for the distribution into a trust of which such trust said Madeline
Vai or her duly appoiuted guardian shall be the beneficiary, an amount of
money or property as will, upon the Husband's death, fairly and adequately
pay for and discharge any and all expense for the care, support and maintenance of said Madeline Vai during the remainder of her lifetime. The Hus-
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Subsequently, Tranquilla's action for separate maintenance
was abandoned, but she left the family home and moved to
another residence.
In April 1953 John executed a will in which he carried out
the obligations imposed upon him by the agreement and left
the residue of his estate in a trust under the terms of which
the income would be paid to Madeline's guardian for her
support and maintenance. He died on February 14,1957.
It is estimated that the cost of supporting Madeline is
$2,500 a month and, when this amount is capitalized, it represents a liability of $515,341.56 as of the date of John's deatll.
The value of the residue considerably exceeded the amount
necessary for Madeline's support, but the issue in controversy
here is confined to the taxability of the $515,341.56. The
inheritance tax appraiser representing the Controller, petitioner in this proceeding, imposed a tax on the entire residue,
and the executors objected to his report, claiming that
$515,341.56 should be allowed as a deduction for the purpose
of calculating the inheritance tax due because assertedly this
sum was left by John in satisfaction of a valid obligation,
supported by adequate consideration. The probate court overruled the objections, and the executors appeal from the court's
order.
Shortly after John '8 death, Tranquilla brought an action to
rescind the property settlement agreement on the ground that
John had fraudulently concealed community assets from her.
We held, in Vai v. Bank of America (1961) 56 Cal.2d 329 [15
Cal.Rptr. 71, 364 P.2d 247], that John had committed
constructive fraud as a matter of law and that Tranquilla was
entitled to rescind the agreement. 2 This decision and its consequences will be discussed in the portion of this opinion
concerned with the question of consideration.
band further covenants and agrees to hold harmless the Wife during the
balance of the lives of the parties hereto, for the care, support and maintenance of said Madeline Vai.' , The will "heretofore made" referred to in
this provision was apparently revoked and a new will executed by John in
April 1953.
2The executors claim that we merely held in the Vai case that Tranquilla
was not barred from rescinding the agreement by laches. However, the
opinion, after holding that John was guilty of constructive fraud as a
matter of law, states, "It is manifest from the foregoing that plaintiff
is neither estopped nor barred by laches from seeking to rescind the
property settlement agreement, and that she is entitled to the relief sought
because of the constructive fraud of her husband." (Italics added.) (56
Cal.2d at p. 344.) The relief TranquilIa sought is described at page 333 of
the opinion as rescission of the agreement on the ground of fraud, recovery of part of the property received by John under the agreement, and
damages in the event recovery thereof cannot be obtained.
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Section 13601 of the Revenue and Taxation Code provides,
"A transfer by wiU or the laws of succession of this State
from a person who dies seized or possessed of the property
transferred while a resident of this State is a transfer subject
to this part." (Italics added.) The executors, in contending
that the money left for Madeline's support is not taxable,
assert that it was transferred to her pursuant to the property
settlement agreement between John and Tranquilla rather
than "by will," that as soon as the agreement was signed·
Madeline had a vested right to support from her father which
she could have enforced as a third party beneficiary in an
action for damages or quasi-specific performance without
regard to the will, and that the will was merely the instrument
by which John's obligation under the' agreement was per.
formed. They place reliance primarily upon Estate of B~lknap
(1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 644 [152 P.2d 657]. [2] In discussing this contention, we shall first assume arguendo that John
received adequate consideration within the meaning of the
inheritance tax law for his bequest to Madeline and that the
property settlement agreement is valid and sufficiently certain
in all respects.
In Estate of Belknap (1944) supra, 66 Cal.App.2d 644, a
husband and wife entered into a property settlement agreement which provided that the wife was to receive a stipulated monthly sum during the husband's lifetime and that he
would authorize his executor by the' terms of his will to pur..
('hase a $20,000 annuity for her, from which she would receive
the income. It was held that the value of the annuity bonds
was not subject to inheritance tax because the transfer was
effected by virtue of the property settlement agreement rather
than by means of the will. The court found that the will was
merely the conduit through which the husband's obligations .
under the agreement were fulfilled, that the amount of the
wife's interest in the husband's property was fixed by the
agreement and was not changed by the will, that the provision
in the will for the purchase of the bonds merely secured the
vested interests transferred by the agreement, and that the
agreement was enforceable by the wife without regard to the
will.
The rationale of Belknap is apposite here. If John had
failed to carry out his obligations under the property settlement agreement Madeline could have enforced her rights as a
third party beneficiary by an action at law for damages or by
an equitable action for quasi-specific performance. (Brow-n v.

)
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Superior Court (1949) 34 Ca1.2d 559,563-564 [212 P.2d 878].)
The will could neither add to nor subtract from the benefits to
which she was entitled by the agreement and, as in Belknap,
the will was merely the conduit through which John's obligations under the agreement were performed. While the enjoyment of the benefits Madeline was to receive under the will
and the actual transfer of the property to her were postponed
until John's death, her right to receive such benefits upon his
death arose immediately upon the signing of the agreement,
and the will was merely the instrumentality through which he
fulfilled his obligations. Madeline's interest cannot be rendered taxable by the mere fact that John performed, by a
provision in his will, an obligation for which his estate would
have been liable in any event.
The Controller argues that Belknap is distinguishable
because there the amounts the husband agreed to pay were
specified in the agreement, whereas in the present case the
sums which John was to provide for Madeline's support dur...
ing her lifetime and at his death were not specified and could
vary, depending upon the size of John's estate and Madeline's
needs.' This argument goes to the question whether the
property settlement agreement in the present case is enfor~
able and sufficiently certain, but does not relate to whether,
assuming the enforceability of the agreement, the life estate
must nevertheless be deemed taxable as a transfer by will. 4
Moreover, the amount which Madeline needed for her support
readily could have been made certain by being reduced to a
monetary sum, as was done in the present proceeding, and
John's promise in the agreement to leave her an amount of
money in his will which would be necessary for her support
was not made contingent upon the size of his estate.
\

'The agreement provided only that the will would leave in trust for
Madeline'8 benefit "an amount of money or property as will . . • fairly
and adequately pay for and discharge any and all expense' , for Madeline's
care and support.
"The Controller also contends that there is language in the agreement
in Belknap which distinguishes it from the contract involved here. In
BeZknap it was provided, "Said party of the first part does by these
presents, promise and agree by and through his Last Will and Testament
(lnd does hereby authorize, empower, direct and command the Executor
of his said Last Will and Testament, to purchase immediately upon his
appointment an annuity ••.. " While it is true that this provision purported to give a present direction to the executor to carry out the terms
of the agreement, and article IV of the agreement between John and
Tranquilla, quoted in footnote 1, only recites that John shall keep in full
force and effect a will which would carry out his obligations, this difference seems of little significance.

)
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In re Howell's Estate (1931) 255 N.Y. 211 [174 N.E. 4571,
cited by the Controller, is distinguishable. There, the separation agreement provided that the wife would receive under her
husband's will one-third of the net income from his estate.
The court held that the agreement did not recognize the existence of a specific debt and that the husband agreed only to
devise a portion of his estate if he had one. In the present case,
John agreed to provide sufficient funds in his will for Madeline's support, regardless of the size or character of bis
estate.
The Controller relies principally on the case of Estate 01
Grogan (1923) 63 Cal.App. 536 [219 P. 87], in support of bis
claim that Madeline's interest is subject to a tax. In Grogan a
husband and wife entered into a property settlement agreement which provided that the husban~ would pay bis wife
$3,000 a year during his lifetime and that, after his death, sbe
would receive the income from a trust fund created by his
will, which would consist of one-half of his estate, but not
exceeding $50,000. The parties were subsequently divorced,
and the husband made a will in conformity with the agreement. A tax was imposed on the value of the life estate
created in the will and the wife claimed, as do the executors in
the present case, that the will merely operated as the ful1illment of the obligation of the husband under the agreement
and did 110t constitute a bequest or transfer within the mean...
ing of the statutes governing inheritance taxes. Section 2 of
the inheritance tax act provided at the time, "A tax shall be,
and is, hereby imposed upon the transfer of any property
. . . (1) When the transfer is by will." The court, after
reviewing authorities from a number of jurisdictions, held
that every transfer in the nature of a change of ownership
effected through a will was subject to an inheritance tax under
the ~tatute.
The Grogan opinion states, at page 544, "No exception of
the character claimed by appellant here is mentioned in the
California statute. Nothing is said about any transfer by will
arising out of an agreement, or as compensation for service, or
in consideration of anything whatsoever. It matters not
whether the legacy be a gratuity or 'for money's worth.'
Thcre iq nothing in the statute which would indicate an intention on the part of the legislature that there should be any
limitation on the apparently plain language contained therein,
or that there should be any exception whatsoever thereto.
Everything in the nature of a change of ownership ~ffected
through a will is apparently included. The reason for such
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transfer is not taken into consideration. The result is all that
is considered; that is, the transfer itself. Viewed from one
standpoint, it might be said that Mrs. Grogan's right was one
which rested in the agreement entered into between her and
her husband; that sIle had in effect bought and paid for everything that she was to receive, and that nothing remained to be
done but the turning over of the property to her through the
medium of the will. But even that does not surmount tIle
obstacle. . . . The statute here does not provide for a tax
because someone has a right arising out of a debt or otherwise,
but only when a transfer of property is brought about by
means of a will is a tax imposed. It is a tax upon the vellicle
carrying the right, rather than a tax upon the right itself. It is
in effect a declaration of law that when a will is used as a
means of conveyance of property a tax must be paid for that
privilege." (Accord, In t'e Gould's Estate (1898) 156 N.Y.
423 [51 N.E. 287].)
We conclude that the foregoing unequivocal rule of Grogan
must be disapproved, for it makes the imposition of the tax
dependent upon form rather than substance. The inheritance
tax is imposed on the beneficial succession to property. (Estate
of Barter (1947) 30 Ca1.2d 549, 557 [184 P.2d 305] ; Estate of
Madison (1945) 26 Ca1.2d 453, 458 [159 P.2d 630].) Grogan
holds that everything in the nature of a change of ownership
effected through a will is taxable because the tax is on the
1Jehicle carrying the right rather than on the right itself and
that, therefore, a bequest in a will in payment of a debt is
subject to a tax. The anomalous result of this rule is that a tax
must be levied whenever a testator provides in his will that a
creditor is to receive a stated sum in payment of a debt owed
, by the testator, whereas the tax would be avoided by the mere
failure of the testator to specify that the debt be paid, requiring the creditor to receive payment by means of filing a claim
against the estate. The Legislature could not have intended to
make the imposition of the tax depend upon such fortuitous
considerations.
Moreover, as the executors correctly argue, acceptance of the
rule in Grogan would place a premium on the violation of
agreements similar to the one involved here. If John had
breached his agreement and failed to provide in his will for
Madeline's support and she had recovered the value of her lh
estate in an action for damages against the estate, the amourJ
of her recovery would not be, under Grogan, a transfer of
property "brought about by means of a will" and, presun:-

.
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ably, no tax liability would attach.1S [3] As suggested
above, when the testator provides in his will for the payment
of a valid obligation supported by adequate consideration
within the meaning of the inheritance tax law, and the obligation would have been enforceable without regard to the provisions of the will, it is erroneous to conclude that the payment
is taxable as a "transfer by will." The case of Estate of
Grogan (1923) sup'ra, 63 Cal.App. 536, is disapproved insofar
as it is inconsistent with the views expressed herein. 6
[4] As a result of this conclusion, we must also hold that
the provisions of sections 13601-13603 (a) of title 18 of the California Administrative Code, which are in accord with the
Grogan rule, do not represent a cot:rect interpretation of legislative intent. 1

)

I)The Controller relies on In 1'e Kidd's Estate (1907) 188 N.Y. 274
[80 N.E. 924J, for the proposition that if Madeline had sued the estate
to recover the amount to which she would have been entitled under the
property settlement agreement, she would nevertheless have been required
to pay an inheritance tax on the sum she recovered. In Kidd, a testator
failed to carry out the terms of an agreement to leave property to a stepdaughter in his will. and she successfully prosecuted an action to recover
the property which he had agreed to convey to her. It was held that she
was required to pay an inheritance tax on the amount of the judgment
hecause she would have been subject to the tax if the decedent had performed his agreement. If Grogan is correct in holding that the basis on
which the inheritance tax is imposed is that a will is used as the means of
carrying out the testator's intention, it would seem to follow that if the
beneficiary receives the property by means of a court judgment rather than
under the will, the property is not taxable as a transfer by will. This distinction was recognized in In 1'e Gould's Estate (N.Y. 1898) supra, 51
N.E. 287, a case upon which the Controller also relies, in which it was
stated that if the beneficiary of a contract to make a will had elected to
recover by bringing a suit against the estate on the basis of the contract
rather than by accepting the bequest in the will, the amounts recovered in
such a suit would not have been subject to the tax because there would
have been no transfer by will.
61t has been suggested that Grogan has been overruled in Estate 0/
Rath (1937) 10 Cal.2d 399 [75 P.2d 509, 115 A.L.R. 836]. However, that
case involved a different factual situation and G1'ogan was specifically
mentioned as being distinguishable. In Rath, a husband and wife entered
into an agreement under which the wife agreed to leave her separate property to her husband if he survived her, and the husband agreed to leave so
much of the property as was not necessary for his support to the wile's
nephews, upon his death. The husband carried out his promise, and the
court held that the property was not taxable as a transfer from the husband to the nephews, since he was merely a trustee of the property for
them, but was taxable as a transfer from the wife's estate to the nephews.
The opinion distinguishes Grogan on the ground that it involved a situation in which the testator disposed of his own property, not property held
by him in trust for others. (10 Ca1.2d at p. 407.)
1The section provides: "A transfer by will is subject to the Inheritance
Tax Law even though made pursuant to an agreement between the transferee and the decedent for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth which was received by the decedent. In such case, the trans-
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[5] Another contention made by the Controller is that
Madeline's life estate must be held subject to taxation under
the provisions of section 13981 of the Revenue and Taxation
Code. The section provides, "This article [article 2, relating to
deductions] is a limitation on deductions allowable. It is not
intended by this article to allow as a deduction anything that
does not actually reduce the amount of an inheritance or
transfer." It is the Controller's claim that, whether Madeline
takes the value of her life estate as a creditor or as a legatee
she gets the same amount of money from the estate, and that
the value of the life estate cannot be allowed as a deduction
because it "does not actually reduce the amount of an inheritance or transfer. "
It is true that Madeline's resources would be the same
whether she is a creditor or a legatee, but only because in the
present case she fortuitously occupies the role of residuary
legatee and at the same time a posture similar to that of a
creditor insofar as John received consideration for his promise
to leave property to her. Section 13981 could not have been
intended to penalize her merely because she receives property
in this dual capacity. We conclude, therefore, that the word
"transfer" as used in the section was not intended to relate
to a situation in which the beneficiary has a right to receive
the transfer independently of the will.
[6] The property left by John for Madeline's support is
free from taxation only if the circumstances indicate that he
received adequate consideration for his promise to leave it to
her. We come, therefore, to the question whether such consideration is present here. The executors urge that we must
assume that John received consideration for his promise to
support Madeline because the property settlement agreement
was in writing (Civ. Code, § 1614), and that, therefore, John
left the amount in question to Madeline in satisfaction' of a
valid obligation supported by an adequate consideration.
[7] The difficulty with this contention is the assumption
that, merely because there may be suffi~ient consideration as
between the spouses in a property settlement' agreement, it
necessarily follows that there is also consideration for purposes of determining whether an inheritance tax is due. This
conclusion is unwarranted. While a grossly disproportionate
division of property between spouses does not render the
agreement void for inadequate consideration, since intangible
feree takes from the decedent under the will and not by virtue of the
agreement.' ,

154
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factors as well as the property received by the parties are
weighed in the balance in determining the adequacy of consideration as between spouses, the tax consequences of the
contract are another matter. (Cf. Chemical Bank New York
Trust Co. v. United States (1966) 249 F.Supp. 450, 459-460.)
Obviously, there are unlimited contrivances for avoidance of
the inheritance tax by the device of a bequest in fulfillment of
an obligation undertaken in a property settlement agreement,
for which the testator does not receive a full consideration in
money or money's worth.
[8] We are aided in determining what constitutes c.nsideration for tax purposes by the provisions of the Revenue
and Taxation Code. relating to inter vivos transfers. (Rev. &
Tax. Code, §§ 13641-13648.) These sections provide that where
a testator has made an actual transfer of property during his
lifetime, the transfer is taxable under the inheritance tax law
to the extent that it was made without a valuable consideration, if the testator retained certain specified incidents of
ownership over the property while he was alive. 8 The purpose
of these provisions is to prevent evasion of the inheritance tax.
(Estate of Madison (1945) supra, 26 Cal.2d 453, 463.) At the
time of John's death, section 13641 of the code provided that
as to inter .vivos transfers, a valuable and adequate consideration was consideration in money or money's worth to the full
value of the property transferred 9 and sections 13641-13648(a)
of title 18 of the California Administrative Code provide that
consideration in money or money's worth does not include any
consideration which is not reducible to money or a money
value, such as love or affection or a promise of marriage.
Analogism dictates that we apply the same standard of
8For example, an inter vivos transfer is taxable to the extent that the
testator has failed to receive consideration for it where the transfer is
made in contemplation of death (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13642), where possession or enjoyment does not take place until after tile death of the testator
(Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13643), where he has retained a life interest in the
income (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13644), and where the transfer was made
by means of a revocable trust (Rev. & Tax. Code, § 13646).
9Scction 13641 was amended in 1959, after J olm 's death, to provide as
follows: 'l If a transfer specified in this article is made during lifetime
by a resident ... for a consideration in money or money's worth, but the
transfer is not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth, the amount of the transfer subject to this part
shall be the excess of (a) '1'he value, at the date of the transferor's death,
of the property transferred, over (b) An amount equal to the same proportion of the value, at the time of tile transferor's death, of the property transferred which the consideration received in money or money 'II
worth for the property transferred bears to the value, at the date of
transfer, of the property transferred."
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cQnsideration in the situation involved here, where no actual
transfer of property occurred during the testator's lifetime
but the right to the transfer upon the testator's death is based
on a valid contract into which he had entered. If wc accepted
the view that what is consideration between the parties to an
agreement in the situation involved here must also be deemed
consideration for the purpose of determining whether an
inheritance tax is payable, it would mean that property transferred by a testator who makes an actual transfer during his
lifetime but retains some incidents of control over it, is subject
to a greater tax burden than property over which a decedent
has retained complete ownership during his life. The Legislature could not have intended such an anomalous result.
We must determine, therefore, whether John received consideration in money or money's worth under the definition set
forth above, for his promise to leave money in his will for
Madeline's support, for it is only to this extent that t]1e
amount in question is free from th,e inheritance tax. As stated
above, a short time after John's death, Tranquilla brought an
action to rescind the property settlement agreement on the
ground that John had fraudulently concealed community
assets from her. The trial court found against Tranquilla, but
in Vai v. Bank of America (1961) supra, 56 Ca1.2d 329, we
held that she was entitled to rescind the agreement. Subsequently, Tranquillaentered into a stipulation with the executors under which she received $500,000 as damages for John's
fraud. She also waived her rights under the property settlement agreement, except the right to have John earry out his
obligations for Madeline's support. Judgment by stipulation
was entered, setting forth the terms of the settlement and
'decreeing that the agreement between John and Tranquilla
was valid.
[9] In determining whether John received consideration
for his promise, we cannot ignore events which occurred after
his death, insofar as they affected the terms of the original
agreement. In addition to the amount specified in thc original
agreement,10 Tranquilla received $500,000 as compensation for
John's fraud. However, if she had rescinded the original
agreement, as she was entitled to do, she would in all likelihood have been entitled to considerably more than these sums,
since J obn 's estate at the time of his death amounted to over
10Tranquilla received only a fraction of the community property in
the original agreement, as shown by our opinion in Vai v. Bank of .America
(1961) su.pra, 56 Cal.2d 329.
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$1,800,000. The estate was enriched, therefore, to the extent
that she received less than she was entitled to by rescission.
Under these unusual circumstances, the question of the extent
to which John receivcd consideration for the $515,341.56 must
be measured by the difference between what Tranquilla would
have received, had she rescinded the agreement, and what she
actually received under the agreement and the subsequent
compromise settlement. This is the measure of the consideration received by John for his promise to leave money in trust
for Madeline's support and is, accordingly, the limit of the
deduction allowable. The record does not contain information
sufficient to permit this court to make the necessary calcula.
tions, and the matter must therefore be returned to the
probate court for the purpose of ascertaining the deduction
allowable.
The executors contend that consideration for John's
promise to support Madeline may be found in the provisions of
the agreement that he would only be liable for $10,000 of
Tranquilla's attorney's fees, that he could retain all income
from tax refunds as his separate property, and that he was
free from liability for Tranquilla's obligations. There is no
indication in the record as to the amount of Tranquilla's
attorney~s fees and no claim that she had any unpaid obligations or that John expected to or did receive any tax
refunds. [10] The fact that John was entitled to Madtline's custody cannot be viewed as consideration "in money or
money's worth" as that term is defined above.
The order is reversed for further proceedings consistent
with the views expressed herein.

McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Burke, J.,
concurred.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-I dissent.
The Legislature has provided in plain terms that every
transfer by will is subject to the inheritance tax. 1 A testator's
transfer by bequest or devise in performance of an agreement
is no less a "transfer by will" than a bequest or devise for
allY other purpose. Nothing in the present statute or its predelRevenue & Taxation Code. section 13401: "An inheritance tax is
hereby imposed upon every transfer subject to this part. I I
Revenue & Taxation Code. section 13601: "A tran8fer by will or the
laws of succession of this State from a person who dies seized or possessed of the property transferred while a resident of this State ia a
transfer subject to this part. I I (Italics added.)
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cessors suggests that a transfer by will pursuant to an enforceable contract is excepted from the normal operation of the tax.
In all the years since the Legislature first selected succession
as a subject of tax (Stats. 1853, ch. 127, art. V [Compo Laws
of Cal, Garfielde, 1853, p. 678]) it has never so much as intimated in any provision for computation of the tax, deductions
or exemptions, or in any other provision that it meant to
exclude from "transfer by will" a transfer by will pursuant
to a contract.
.
The 1893 inheritance tax statute (Stats. 1893, ch. 168, p.
193) and subsequent statutes have also imposed an inheritance
tax on certain inter vivos transfers. 2 The purpose of this tax is
to reach inter vivos transfers so like testamentary dispositions
that they might be used in lieu thereof to avoid the inheritance
tax. (Estate of Potter (1922) 188 Cal. 55, 63 [204 P. 826] ;
Estate of Thurston (1950) 36 Cal.2d 207, 210-211 [223 P.2d
12].) The tax on such inter vivos transfers "does not turn
upon the intention of the grantor, but upon the character of
the interests created by the transfer." (Estate of Hyde
(1949) 92 Cal.App.2d 6, 14 [606 P.2d 420].)
The literal terms of the earlier California statutes would
have imposed a succession tax on any inter vivos transfer
made in contemplation of death, or intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after the transferor's death,
even though the transferee had bought and paid full value for
his intereBt. The California courts, however, like those of most
other jurisdictions (see 7 A.L.R. 1053; 157 A.L.R. 984), held
that the statute was not deBigned to tax such transfers made
for valuable and adequate consideration. The theory of these
decisions is that "The result of such sales, at full value, would
in no wise defeat the statutory purpose; the estate would not
be depleted, but merely changed in form." (In re Kraft's
Estate (1928) 103 N.J.Eq. 543 [143 A. 764, 766] ; In re Orvis'
Estate (1918) 223 N.Y. 1 [119 N.E. 88, 89, 3 A.L.R. 1636].)
The addition of the words "made without valuable and adequate consideration" to the description of taxable inter vivos
transfers in the 1911 California inheritance tax statute (Stats.
2In taxing inter viV08 transfers the present statute declares the Legislature's "purpose • . • to tax every transfer made in lieu of or to avoid
the passing of property by will or the laws of succession. I I (Rev. & Tax.
Code, 113648.) The statute also taxes the vesting of the survivor's right
in joint tenancy (Rev. & Tax. Code, 113671) or homestead (Rev. & Tax.
Code, f 13622), the granting of a family allowance in probate (Rev. &I
Tax. Code, f 13623) and the transfer of the proceeds of life insurance
(Rev. '" Tax Code, f 13722).
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1911, ch. 395, p. 713) "served but to clarify and not to change
the pre-existing law." (Estate of Reynolds (1915) 169 Cal.
600, 601 [147 P. 268] ; Abstract &- Title Guar. Co. v. State
(1916) 173 Cal. 691, 694 [161 P. 264].)
"The use of the word 'valuable' in the act of 1911, excludes
considerations of love and affection." (Estate of Brix (1919)
181 Cal. 667, 674 [186 P. 135].) The Brix case also held that
"adequate consideration" was the same as that required for
specific performance of a contract. (Civ. Code, § 3391, subd.
1. ) Since such adequacy was peculiarly a question of fact
dependent on the circumstances of the particular case
(O'Hara v. Wattson (1916) 172 Cal. 525 [157 P. 608]), the
Brix holding gave considerable scope for inheritance tax
avoidance. Although this court had originally indicated that
under the 1911 act consideration, to be "adequate," had to be
reasonably and objectively measurable in money,S the Brix
case in effect left the measurement of adequacy to the parties
so long as they "looked at the transaction from a pecuniary
and not a sentimental standpoint." (181 Cal. at p. 678.)4 To
aIn Estate of Reynolds (1915) supra, 169 Cal. 600, the decedent had
trausferred a going business to his adult son for a consideration measurable in money, but in circumstances indicating that the transfer was in
lieu of a t()Stamentary disposition. The value of the consideration was
much less than the value of the business. In upholding taxability, this
court said (169 Cal. at p. 604) that such consideration "certainly was
not adequate from any commercial point of view." The Reynolds case
was followed in Estate of Jl'elton (1917) 176 Cal. 663, 668 [169 P. 392]
(inter vivos transfer by father to adult son of stock in closely held family
corporation).
4Estate of Brix (181 Cal. at p. 674) declared that the statement as to
consideration "from a commercial point of view" in the Reynolds case
, 'was not intended as a complete definition of adequacy of the consideration, but merely to indicate that the particular transaction there considered, being a sale of a going business, must be regarded from the same
point of view as any commercial transaction. I'
The transaction considered in Brix was not commercial. Decedent and
his wife executed a property settlement agreement and three contemporaneous deeds of realty. The controller sought to uphold the imposition ot
the inheritance tax on only one part of the transaction, a deed from
decedent and his wife to their three children, reserving a life estate to
decedent.
Brix arose under the 1911 inheritance tax statute. The court refused to
apply, as declarative of previously existing law, the 1917 amendment
defining "valuable and adequate consideration" as "equal in money or
in money's worth to the full value of the property transferred." It said
(181 Cal. at p. 674 et seq.), "We think the rule applicable in specific
performance cases, so far as the mercenary side of it is concerned, should
control. Considering the transactions in that light, this transfer . . . was
made for an adequate considf'ration 'in money's worth.' ... [Decedent]
obtained a release of his wife's claims, not only to the property [formerly
community 1 he retained, but to nIl other property which he might thereafter acquire, and became free from her interference in any dealings he
might wish thereafter to make in property.•.. Who can say how much it
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emphasize that consideration for inheritance tax purposes
should be objectively measured, the Legislature in 1917 defined
"valuable and adequate consideration" as "a consideration
equal in money or in money's worth to the full value of th('
property transferred." (Stats. -1917, ell. 589, § 2, subd. 3,
p. 882.) This definition was carried into the subsequent inheritance tax statutes and was codified in 1943 (Rev. & Tax. Code,
§ 13641).
Although the Legislature has thus been concerned over the
years with consideration in connection with inter vivos transfers, it has never spoken of consideration in connection with
transfers by will. The reason is obvious. 'Vhell the Legislature
provided that every transfer by will is taxable, that is exactly
what it meant. (Estate of Grogan (1923) 63 Cal.App. 536, 543
[219 P. 87].) Its distinction between testamentary and inter
tJivos transfers is not unreasonable or unfair. (See Stebbins v.
Riley (1925) 268 U.S. 137, 141-143 [45 S.Ct. 424, 69 L.Ed.
884, 44 A.L.R. 1454].) The Legislature could reasonably find
-that ordinarily the making of a will is not the subject of
bargains entered into for solely pecuniary consideration, and
in the exercise of its power to classify for tax purposes it
could quite, properly decide, as it did, to tax "every" "transfer by will. ~ ,
The Legislature's language is certainly apt for that purpose
in the light of the rules of statutory construction set forth by
this court with regard to the 1905, 1911, and 1913 inheritance
tax acts: " 'It is thought to be only reasonable to intend that
the legislature in making provisions for such proceedings [imposition and collection of taxes] would take unusual care to
make use of terms which would plainly express its meaning, in
order that ministerial officers might not be left in doubt in the
exercise of unusual powers, and that the citizen might know
exactly what were his duties and liabilities. A strict construction in such cases seems reasonable, because presumptively the
legislature has given in plain terms all the power it intended
to be exercised.' (1 Cooley on Taxation, 453.) This rule is, of
course, to be applied only where some ambiguity exists or
doubt arises from the language used as to the meaning
intended. 'Beyond the words employed, if the meaning is plain
was worth to him in money, to have bis marital troubles settled in this
way' He had a just expectancy of many years of life. It is apparent that
the parties looked at the transaction from a pecuniary and not a sentimental standpoint. They evidently regarded the consideration as adequate and they were in a much better position to place a value thereon
than is this court."
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and intelligible, neither officer or court is to go in search of the
legislative intent.' (Ibid., 450.)" (Estate of Potter (1922)
supra, 188 Cal. 55, 64-65.)
It is, of course, still the rule that "it is the function of the
courts to construe and apply the [inheritance tax] law as it is
enacted and not to add thereto nor detract therefrom.' ,
(Kirkwood v. Bank of A.merica (1954) 43 Ca1.2d 333, 341 [273
P.2d 532] ; In re Miller (1947) 31 Ca1.2d 191, 199 [187 P.2d
722J.) We cannot properly add to the article of the inheritance tax statute concerning transfers by will the provisioJ,l as
to valuable and adequate consideration that the Legislature
advisedly placed only in the article concerning inter vivos
transfers.
Nor can we make such an addition to the statute on the
ground invoked in Estate of Belknap (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d
644 [152 P.2d 657], that the will is "merely the conduit" by
which the testator performs his inter vivos obligation when a
transfer by will is made in accordance with an enforceable
contract supported by adequate consideration. I The conclusion, that the transfer by the "mere conduit" of the will is
not taxable, is based on the mistaken assumption that for
I5The court in Belknap (66 Cal.App.2d at p. 654) misconstrued an
opinion of this court (Estate 01 Bath (1937) 10 Cal.2d 399, 401 [15 P.2d
509, 115 A.L.R. 836]) and a superseded opinion of a District Court of
Appeal (Estate 01 Madison, 26 Cal.2d 453 [148 P.2d 668]) to reach the
conclusion that this court had "modified" Esta" 01 GrogaA (1923)
.tUpra, 63 Cal.App. 536, to free from the inheritance tax the very kind of
transaction that Grogan. held taxable. The Belknap court derived its characterization of the will as a "mere conduit" from Estate 01 Bath, .tUpra.
The Bath ease involved facts distinctly different from those involved here
and from those in Grogan. and Belknap. Bath held that in furlng the inheritance tax the probate court could and should look behind what appeared
to be an absolute devise of the fee in real property from decedent Rath
to the nephews of his previously deceased wife and tax the transfer for
what it actually was; i.e., a gift from the previously deceased wife to
her nephews of an interest in property that decedent Rath held as trustee
during his life. In other words, the court refused to apply the parol evidence rule to preclude taxation of the beneficial transfer that in fact took
place. The effect of the decision in Bath was to reduce the amount of tax
payable by the nephews, because they in fact took from their aunt rather
than from decedent, a stranger in blood. Conversely, however, an inter
viv08 transfer that appears absolute on its face can be shown by parol
evidence to have been made on terms that subject it to the inheritance tax.
(See Kelly v. Woolsey (1918) 177 Cal. 325,329, 334 [110 P. 831] j Estate
01 Madison (1945) 26 Cal.2d 453, 456 [159 P.2d 630].)
The Bath case states (10 Ca1.2d at p. 401), "Decisions such as In. 1'e
[Estate of] Grogan, 63 Ca1.App. 536 [291 P. 87], In. 1'e Gould's Estate,
156 N.Y. 423 [51 N.E. 287], and In re Kidd's Estate, 188 N.Y. 274 [80
N.E. 924], do not consider the problem determined herein. Said decisions
are to the effect that a transfer made by will is taxable although in pursuance of a contract, in payment of a debt, or for services rendered. Said
decisions had 1'eference to a Iituation where the testato1' i& di&porin.1I of
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inheritance tax purposes a contractual obligation to make a
will is no different from an ordinary contract obligation
undertaken by decedent during his lifetime and enforceable
against his estate because by chance he died before performing
it. When decedent promised to create a testamentary trust, he
"did not contract to convey; he contracted to make a will' 'G
(I'll, re Howell's Estate (1931) 255 N.Y. 211 [174 N.E. 457,
459] ; Oarter v. Oraig (1914) 77 N.H. 200 [90 A. 598, Ann.Cas.
1914D 1179, 52 L.R.A. N.S. 211]), and the contractual right
acquired by the obligee was to a transfer subject to the laws
. governing testamentary transfers (Olarke v. Treasurer (1917)
226 Mass. 301 [115 N.E. 416, 417]). Therefore, as held in the
cases last cited, a transfer by will pursuant to contract is
subject to the inheritance tax. 7

CJ
"

hiB oum property, not of property held by him in trust for other8, as to
which his will is a mere conduit of title." (Italics added.)
The court in BeZknap (66 Cal.App.2d at p. 654) seized on the last quoted
phrase (applied by the Rath court, of course, to the will of Mr. Bath, not
the wills of Grogan and Gould) and incorrectly said that the opinion of
the District Court of Appeal in Estate of Madison, 26 Ca1.2d 453 [148
P.2d 668] (superseded by the opinion of this court in 26 Cal.2d 453)
, 'cites with approval the Estate of Rath as authority for the construction
of the statute holding that the Inheritance Tax Act imposes a tax on the
theory of 'succession,' and not merely because the will is 'used as a means
of conveyance' "; thus Belknap came to the erroneous conclusion "that
the Grogan case has been modified to that extent."
8The essential difference in the rights of the beneficiary under a contract
to create an inter vi110S trust and a contract to create a testamentary trust
is obvious. When John's promise in the present case was made to maintain
in effect a will providing for distribution into a trust for Madeline's bene1it of an amount of money or property that would adequately pay for her
support during the remainder of her life. it gave the donee beneficiary
110 more than the possibility that at some future time she might have some
kind of cause of action against someone (see Brown v. Superior Oourt
(1949) 34 Cal.2d 559, 563 [212 P.2d 878]; Brewer v. Simpson (1960) 53
CaUd 567, 593 [349 P.2d 289]; Ludwicki v. Guerin (1961) 57 Ca1.2d 127,
130 et seq. [17 Cal.Rptr. 873, 367 P.2d 415]; Day v. Greene (1963) 59
CaUd 404. 411 [29 Cal.Rptr. 785. 380 P.2d 385. 94 A.L.R. 802]) if she
did not predecease John (see O'Brien v. O'Brien (1925) 197 Cal. 577,589
[241 P. 861]).
7The New York court in Howell's Estate, B'Upra, stated that any confusion in previous New York decisions was cleared by N. Y. Laws of 1925.
chapter 143. That statute (similar to our inheritance tax statute) provided that if an inter vivos transfer, otherwise liable to tax, "is made for
a valuable consideration, the portion of the transfer for which the
grantor or vendor receives equivalent monetary value is not taxable."
but clearly did not so provide as to transfers by will or intestacy.
Howell holds that under the 1925 New York statute both transfers
by will and receipt of property by specific enforcement of a contract to
transfer by will are "subject to the rule formulated in eases like Gould's
nnd Kidd 's." (In re Gould's Estate (1898) ]56 N.Y. 423 [51 N.E. 287,
288]. imposing a tax on a testamentary transfer in ngreed payment for
services rendered by the testator's sonj In re Kidd'8 Estate (1907) 188
~C.Jd~
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One who bargains and pays for a promise to make a will
presumably knows that thc promised transfer will be subject
to the tax, particularly since our inheritance tax statutes have
always unequivocally made a transfer by will taxable. s Taxability of the transfer the legatee and testator have bargained
for is a part of the bargain. If the legatee wishes a distributive
share undiminished by inheritance tax, he can bargain for a
will so providing. (See Estate of Irwin (1925) 196 Cal. 366,
375 [237 P. 1074].) The same, of course, is true when the
contract to make a will is for the benefit of one who is not a
party to the contract, as in the case of Madeline here.
Adherence to the statute does not put a premium on the
violation of such agreements. A decedent's failure to perform
his contract to make a specified testamentary disposition does
not relieve from the operation of the inheritance tax statute a
transfer by intestate succession or by a will that does not
conform to his contract. Whether or not the decedent performs
his contract, transfers of his property are subject to the
inheritance tax. Illustrative of this situation is In re Kidd'$
Estate (1907) supra, 188 N.Y. 274 [80 N.E. 924]. There
decedent, by antenuptial contract with his wife, promised to
bequeath all his property to the wife's daughter (his stepdaughter).. He died leaving a will that bequeathed his
property to others. 'rhe stepdaughter obtained a decree directing the executors and beneficiaries named in the will to
execute releases and conveyances of the property to her. The
court of appeals rejected the stepdaughter's contention that
there was no taxable transfer. It pointed out that had decedent
performed his contract, the transfer by will would have been
taxed, and that in enforcing the contract equity" converts the
devisees under the will, or the heirs at law or next of kin, as
the case may require, into trustees for the beneficiary under
the original agreement." Therefore, the court concluded, "the
devolution of the property has in fact taken place under the
N.Y. 274 [80 N.E. 924], imposing the inheritance tax on the transfer of
decedent's property to plaintiff stepdaughter, decreed in her suit for
specific performance of decedent's antenuptial agreement with plaintiff's
mother.)
8 Although there has been a conflict since 1944 between Belknap and
the earlier Grogan decision, the State Controller's regulations continue to
follow tha inheritance tax law as written: "A transfer by will is subject
to the Inheritance Tax Law even though made pursuant to an agreement
between the transferee and the decedent for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth which was received by the decedent.
In such case, the transferee takes from the deceient under the will and
not by virtue of the agreement." (Cal.Admin.Code (1959), tit. 18,
§§ 13601·13603 (a).)
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will, and such devolution is subject to the transfer taX." (See
also People v. Field's Estate (1910) 248 Ill. 147 [93 N.E. 721,
723, 33 L.R.A. N.S. 230] : "Illustration is not necessary to
show that any other rule would enable parties desiring to do
1>0 to in a measure defeat the object and purpose ,of the statute. ")
When the beneficiary of the contract to make a will that
decedent has breached obtains specific performance, those to
whom the property passes by the law of testate or intestate
succession hold as trustees for the beneficiary. (Ludwicki v.
Guerin (1961) supra, 57 Ca1.2d 127, 130.) The beneficial
transfer that in fact takes place is taxed (see Estate of Rath
(1937) supra, 10 Cal.2d 399), and the beneficiary of the
contract pays the tax: rather than those to whom the property
devolved by operation of the will or intestacy.
It is contended that it would be anomalous to impose a tax
whenever a testator provides in his will that a creditor shall
receive a stated sum in payment of a 'debt owed by the
testator, although there would be no tax when the testator
failed to specify that the debt be paid, thus requiring the
creditor to file a claim against the estate. There is no such
anomaly. No statute provides that a testator can force his
creditor to take a stated sum as a taxable legacy and thus
deprive the creditor of his right to be paid as a creditor. 'Vhen
a testator gives a legacy to a creditor in payment of a debt, the
choice to collect as creditor or to take as legatee remains with
the creditor. He can renounce the legacy and collect his claim
as a debt. (See Sheppard v. Desmond (Tex.Civ.App. 1943) 169
S.W.2d 788, 790.) When the creditor renounces, he is not
chargeable with any tax: on the amount he receives in payment
of his claim.
Assume a will that provides, "I bequeath to C the sum of
$10,000 in payment of my debt to him." Assume further that
the amount of the debt is $10,000, that C renounces the legacy
and files a creditor's claim, and that the claim is allowed. 9
The tax would be computed as follows:
9The following provisions of the inheritance tax statute (Rev. & Tax.
Code, dive 2, pt. 8) would govern computation of the tax:
, 'If a transferee under a will renounces his rights under the will . . .
the tax is nevertheless computed in accordance with the terms of the
will admitted to probate." (§ 13409.)
"l'be tax is computed upon the clear market value of tlie property
transferred. • . ."
(§ 13402.)
'" Clear market value' means the
market value of any property included in any transfer, less any deductions allowable by this part." (§ 13312.)
The article of the statute relating to deductions "is a limitation on
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Value of the property subject to the
inheritance tax statute transferred to the
particular transferee
•.
••
Allowable deduction provided in
section 13981 et seq...
•••
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$10,000
10,000

••
- 0 Clear market v a l u e .
Tax..
••
None
If the value of a legacy left in express payment of the
testator's debt to the legatee is greater than the amount of the
debt, the legatee may prefer to take the legacy. In such case,
however, he cannot also have the amount of the debt deducted
from the value of the legacy in computation of the tax. (Rev.
& Tax. Code, § 13981.) The testator gives the legatee-creditor
his choice and the legatee-creditor takes his choice with
presumed knowledge of the inheritance tax. There is nothing
unfair in the imposition of the same inheritance tax on a
legacy accepted in payment of an ordinary' debt as that
imposed on another legacy of equal value to one who is not a
creditor. Different taxes may be imposed on transfers' of the
same value if the circumstances differ. (Stebbins v. Riley
(1925) supra, 268 U.S. 137, affirming Estate of Watkinscm
(1923) 191 Cal. 591, 599 [217 P. 1073]; Estwte of Elston
(1939) 32 Cal.App.2d 652, 660 [90 P.2d 608].)
It has been suggested that it would be unfair to tax a
transfer by will pursuant to an inter vivos contract in situations similar to that in the Belknap case, supra, 66 Cal. App.
2d 644. For a concededly valuable and adequate consideration
within the meaning of the inheritance tax statute Belknap
contracted in a property settlement agreement to provide by
will that his executor purchase a $20,000 annuity for his wife.
deductions allowable. It is not intended by this article to allow a8 a
deduction anything that does not actually reduce the amount of an
inheritance or transfer." (§ 13981.)
, 'In determining the market value of property included in any trans·
fer subject to this part. the deductions specified in this article. and no
others. are allowed against the appraised value of the property. if the
deductions: (a) Are obligations of the decedent or his estate. except as
otherwise indicated in this article; and (b) Are paid by the estate or the
transferee." (§ 13982.) "Debts of a decedent owed by him at the date
of his death are deductible from the appraised value of property in·
cluded in any transfer subject to this part made by the decedent."
(§ 13983.)
The word "paid" as used in section 13982 does not mean that the
money must have been" physically paid" but may refer to "the amount
finally fixed and which is enforceable."
(Estate of Slack (1948) 86 Cal.
App.2d 49. 53 [194 P.2d 61]; sce Estate of Sl:ifl,"ker (1956) 41 Ca1.2d
290, 294 [303 P.2d 745, 62 A.L.B.2d 1131].)
.;
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His will referred to the property settlement agreement and
directed the executor to purchase the annuity. If the parties
intended that the wife, having paid full value for a $20,000
annuity, should receive an annuity .undiminished by the
. inheritance tax, the solution to the problem lay not in a judicial rewriting of the inheritance tax statute, but in construing
the will in light of the contract as bequeathing $20,000 net for
purchase of the annuity. A legacy of a specified amount free of
inheritance tax is construed as a legacy of a sum sufficient to
net the amount specified after payment of the inheritance tax
thereon, namely, of the amount specified and "an additional
amount sufficient to pay the tax and the tax upon the tax ad
infinitum." (Estate of Irwin (1925) supra, 196 Cal. 366,
375.) Such a construction of the Belknap legacy would effect
the intent expressed by the will (which was also the intent of
the parties to the inter vivos arrangement) without the distortion of the statute resorted to in the Belknap opinion.
Adoption of the theory of the Belknap case not only distorts
a clearly expressed and proper legislative purpose but leads to
confusion and uncertainty in the administration of the statute.
I would therefore disapprove Estate of Belknap, supra, 66
Cal.App.2d 644, and adhere to Estate of Grogan, supra, 63
CalApp. 536, which failhfu~ly followei the statute.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied September
28, 1966. Traynor, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.
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